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I. INTRODUCTION
Terminally ill patients in the United States have four medical options for
controlling the time and manner of their death.1 Three of these are legally available
to certain clinically qualified patients. First, all patients may withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment. Second, all patients may voluntarily stop eating and
drinking. Third, patients with intractable suffering may receive palliative sedation to
unconsciousness.2 In contrast, the fourth option is available in only seven U.S.
jurisdictions.3 Only there may patients legally obtain a prescription for a lethal
medication that they can later self-ingest.
Medical aid in dying (MAID) is not yet legally available in 49 of 56 U.S.
jurisdictions.4 But its legal status has been in a state of rapid change across the
country over the past ten years.5 Before 2008, MAID was legal only in Oregon.
Today, it is explicitly lawful in seven U.S. jurisdictions. Moreover, the rate and pace
of legalization has been accelerating. Three of the now seven MAID jurisdictions
enacted their statutes within only the past two years.6 Moreover, there are widespread
and ongoing legislative and judicial efforts to legalize MAID in more than thirty
other states.7
I have designed this Article to help inform and guide these expanding law
reform efforts. Because a “page of history is worth a volume of logic,”8 it
summarizes earlier efforts (both successful and unsuccessful) to legalize MAID in
the United States.9 In other words, this Article provides a descriptive legal history. It
does not normatively assess either whether any efforts to legalize MAID were good
public policy. Nor does it assess whether advocates grounded their arguments on

1. There are also non-medical options of hastening death. See generally, e.g., PHILIP NITSCHKE &
FIONA STEWART, PEACEFUL PILL HANDBOOK (Exit International, 2017); Michael Majchrowicz, The
Volunteers Who Help People End Their Own Lives, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/07/the-volunteers-who-help-people-end-their-own-lives/489602.
2. See, e.g., Thaddeus M. Pope & Lindsey Anderson, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: A
Legal Treatment Option at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 363 (2011).
3. See infra Sections IV.C, IV.D, and VII.A.
4. MAID is legal in California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Montana, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington. See infra Sections IV and VII.A.
5. Other writers have described the same exit option with other terms. These terms include
“physician assisted suicide,” “physician assisted death,” “death with dignity,” “aid in dying,” and
“physician aid in dying.” I use “MAID,” because that term seems to have the most currency in the primary
literature. See, e.g., Compassion & Choices, Understanding Medical Aid in Dying, https://
www.compassionandchoices.org/understanding-medical-aid-in-dying (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
6. California legalized MAID in October 2015. Colorado legalized MAID in November 2016.
Washington DC legalized MAID in 2017. See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C.
7. See infra Section IV.E.
8. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
9. Cf. Jocelyn Downie, Permitting Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Law Reform
Pathways for Common Law Jurisdictions, 16 QUT L. REV. 84 (2016) (discussing exploratory approach
in addressing relevant legal pathways).
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solid legal analysis. Instead, this Article offers an objective, systematic, and thorough
account of what those efforts were.10
In Section One, I describe MAID. We must first understand what MAID is
before examining attempts to legalize it. Once we grasp the nature of MAID, it starts
to become clear why law reformers have concluded that they must affirmatively
legalize it. In Section Two, I explain that MAID falls within the prohibitory scope of
criminal assisted suicide statutes in almost every state. In other words, MAID is
“assisted suicide.” Assisted suicide is a crime. Therefore, MAID is a crime.
Moreover, in addition to its actual legal status, MAID is widely perceived to be
illegal.11 Therefore, both patients who want to access MAID and physicians who
want to provide MAID have strong incentives to change (or at least clarify) its legal
status.
In the remainder of the Article, I examine five different paths that reformers
have taken to legalize MAID. In Section Three, I start with the most successful
approach, statutory enactment. Six states have enacted MAID statutes: three through
ballot initiatives and three through legislation. I discuss these six states. I also briefly
discuss a few more states that have come close to enacting MAID statutes.
Furthermore, more than one-half of the remaining states have recently considered
legislation. They are likely to continue this deliberation and debate throughout the
2020s.
In Section Four, I examine attempts to legalize MAID through federal
constitutional litigation. Because the U.S. Supreme Court definitively rejected such
arguments in 1997, advocates have since refocused their litigation arguments using
state law theories. In Section Five, I review cases seeking to legalize MAID through
state constitutional litigation. Unfortunately, like federal constitutional claims, state
constitutional claims have also been uniformly unsuccessful.
In Section Six, I discuss attempts to legalize MAID through state statutory
interpretation litigation. These lawsuits argue that MAID does not even constitute
“assisted suicide” in existing criminal statutes. Finally, in Section Seven, I examine
two final paths toward “legalizing” MAID: constraining prosecutorial discretion and
jury nullification. Unlike other approaches, these do not change the legal status of
MAID. Yet, they do change whether prosecutors will or can penalize patient or
physician participants.
In sum, the expanded legalization of MAID seems inevitable. Surveys
consistently show that more than 70 percent of the American public supports

10. This Article focuses on only affirmative efforts to legalize MAID. It does not address state efforts
to criminalize MAID. See, e.g., SB 202, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015); SB 220, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess.
(Mont. (2013); S.B. 167, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011). Nor does it address federal efforts to
challenge the legitimacy of state MAID statutes. See, e.g., Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act, 42
U.S.C. § 14401 (2012): Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Assisted Suicide Prevention Act, S.
3788, 109th Cong. (2006); Pain Relief Promotion Act, H.R. 2260 & S. 1272, 106th Cong. (1999); Lethal
Drug Abuse Prevention Act, H.R. 4006 & S. 2151 105th Cong. (1998).
11. But cf. Kathyrn L. Tucker, Aid in Dying: An End-of-Life Option Governed by Best Practices, 8 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 9 (2012); Scott Foster, Expert Panel Concurs: Hawaii Physicians Can Provide
Aid in Dying, HAWAII REPORTER (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.hawaiireporter.com/expert-panel-concurshawaii-physicians-can-provide-aid-in-dying.
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MAID.12 But the battle will be fought bill-by-bill and lawsuit-by-lawsuit in each
state. I hope to inform these efforts with lessons from the legal history of MAID
described below.

II. WHAT IS MEDICAL AID IN DYING?
There are many circumstances under which a longer life is not a better life.
When quality of life diminishes, some individuals would prefer to hasten death (or
at least not prolong dying) rather than endure the perils of what, at least to them, is
an exceedingly poor quality of life.13 What exactly comprises a “poor quality of life”
covers a broad spectrum that varies significantly from person to person.
For some, loss of independence might diminish quality of life to the point
where they would request a hastened death. For others, it may be extreme physical
suffering. For these and other reasons, requests to hasten death are common
throughout the United States and the world. As Justice Brennan observed, “[f]or
many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent.”14
Many seriously ill patients find their lives marked with extreme suffering
and both physical and mental deterioration. Unfortunately, many do not have access
to a medically supervised, peaceful death. Too many patients commit suicide through
violent means such as shooting, hanging, or various other forms of self-deliverance.15
Moreover, being uncertain about their future options and being worried about future
loss of dignity, comfort, and control, many patients hasten their deaths prematurely.
Medical aid in dying (MAID) provides an alternative: the assurance that terminally
ill patients can die when they want based on their own criteria and can enjoy life for
a longer time.16
Certainly, life is valuable; and societal values reinforce attempting to extend
life indefinitely. But death is unavoidable. People suffering from the diseases that
cause most deaths in this country will often experience significant suffering and loss

12. Polling on Voter Support for Medical Aid in Dying for Terminally Ill Adults, COMPASSION &
CHOICES, https://www.compassionandchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FS-Medical-Aid-inDying-Survey-Results-FINAL-7.21.16-Approved-for-Public-Distribution.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
13. See Janet L. Abrahm, Patient and Family Requests for Hastened Death, HEMATOLOGY 475, 457
(2008) (“Patient and family requests for hastened death are not uncommon among patients with advanced
malignancies.”); Linda Ganzini et al., Oregonians’ Reasons for Requesting Physician Aid in Dying, 169
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 489, 489 (2009) (“One in 10 dying patients will, at some point, wish to hasten
death.”); Jean-Jacques Georges et al., Requests to Forgo Potentially Life-Prolonging Treatment and to
Hasten Death in Terminally Ill Cancer Patients: A Prospective Study, 31 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT.
100, 104 (2006); J. McCarthy et al., Irish Views on Death and Dying: A National Survey, 36 J. MED.
ETHICS 454, 456 (2010) (finding that a majority of individuals strongly agreed with the statement, “If I
were severely ill with no hope of recovery, the quality of my life would be more important than how long
it lasted.”); Diane E. Meier et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193, 1195 (1998).
14. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. Peter M. Marzuk, Suicide and Terminal Illness, 18 DEATH STUDIES 497, 500 (1994); Matthew
Miller et al., Cancer and the Risk of Suicide in Older Americans, 26 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4720, 4722
(2008).
16. See STANLEY A. TERMAN, THE BEST WAY TO SAY GOODBYE: A LEGAL PEACEFUL CHOICE AT
THE END OF LIFE 326–27 (2007).
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of independence.17 In this situation, the preference, for some, may be to hasten death
so that death can be on an individual’s terms and with some predictability, rather
than risking the unknown and potential loss of comfort and dignity.
MAID is one key “exit option.”18 With MAID, a physician writes a
prescription for life-ending medication for a terminally ill and mentally capacitated
adult.19 The practice has long-standing and well-defined conditions regarding patient
eligibility, the role of physicians, and the role of the patient. All six statutes have
nearly identical conditions and safeguards.20 Regarding eligibility, the patient must:
(1) be over 18 years of age, (2) have decision making capacity, (3) be able to selfingest the medication, and (4) be terminally ill, meaning that they have a prognosis
of six months or less.21
Regarding physician practice, both the treating physician and a consulting
physician must: (1) confirm that the patient satisfies all the eligibility conditions; (2)
inform the patient about risks, benefits, and alternatives; and (3) confirm the patient’s
request for the medication is a settled and voluntary decision. If either the treating or
consulting physician suspects that the patient’s judgement is impaired, then they
must refer the patient for a mental health assessment.22
Once the physician writes the prescription, the patient may obtain the
medication. Traditionally, the medication has been secobarbital or pentobarbital, a
barbiturate originally developed as a sleeping pill.23 However, price increases have
led physicians to prescribe other drugs including compounded ones.24 Importantly,
the patient must ingest the drugs herself.25 The patient alone takes the final overt act
that cases her death.

17. Judith K. Schwarz, Stopping Eating and Drinking, AM. J. NURSING, Sept. 2009, at 53, 54.
18. See Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily
Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, in GIVING DEATH A HELPING HAND: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 49 (Dieter Birnbacher & Edgar Dahl eds., 2008).
19. David Orentlicher, Thaddeus M. Pope & Ben A. Rich, Clinical Criteria for Physician Aid in
Dying, 19 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 259, 259 (2016).
20. Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical Aid in Dying: When Legal Safeguards Become Burdensome
Obstacles, THE ASCO POST (Dec. 25, 2017), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/december-252017/medical-aid-in-dying-when-legal-safeguards-become-burdensome-obstacles/; National Academies
of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, Physician Assisted Death: Current Landscape: Implementation
and Practice, YOUTUBE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI58KsPl-HM
(presentation by Thaddeus M. Pope). While Montana has no statute, the conditions and safeguards are
similar.
21. ALAN MEISEL, KATHY L. CERMINARA & THADDEUS M. POPE, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 12.04[C] (3d ed. 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO DIE].
22. Id.
23. April Dembosky, Drug Company Jacks Up Cost Of Aid-In-Dying Medication, NPR (Mar. 23,
2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/23/471595323/drug-company-jacks-up-costof-aid-in-dying-medication.
24. Catherine Offord, Accessing Drugs for Medical Aid-in-Dying, THE SCIENTIST (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/49879/title/Accessing-Drugs-for-Medical-Aidin-Dying/.
25. Amanda M. Thyden: Death with Dignity and Assistance: A Critique of the Self-Administration
Requirement in California’s End of Life Option Act, 20 CHAPMAN L. REV. 421, 421 (2017).
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III. MOST STATES CRIMINALLY PROHIBIT ASSISTED
SUICIDE, AND THEREFORE MAID
Almost every U.S. jurisdiction criminally prohibits assisting another person
to commit suicide.26 Moreover, as the Supreme Court has observed, these assisted
suicide prohibitions are deeply rooted in our nation’s legal history.27 In fact, those
roots date back 150 years. As early as 1868, most states held that assisting suicide
was a criminal offense. The criminal status of assisted suicide has persisted ever
since. Nearly one hundred years later, the American Law Institute included the crime
in its 1962 Modern Penal Code, the seminal work on substantive criminal law.28 Most
recently, many states have reexamined and reaffirmed their bans on assisted
suicide.29
Assisted suicide statutes typically include plain yet broad language. For
example, the New Mexico statute provides: “Assisting suicide consists of
deliberately aiding another in the taking of his own life. Whoever commits assisting
suicide is guilty of a fourth-degree felony.”30 Similarly, the California Penal Code
states: “Every person who deliberately aids, or advises, or encourages another to
commit suicide, is guilty of a felony.”31 Penalties for violation include felony
probation, up to three years in state prison, and/or a fine up to $10,000.32
In addition, for physicians, assisted suicide also constitutes “unprofessional
conduct” that may result in state medical board discipline up to and including

26. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-10-104 (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-56 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 645 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (1971); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2015); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-702 (2006); IDAHO CODE § 18-4017 (2011); 720
III. COMP. STAT. ANN., § 5/12-34.5 (2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (2014); IOWA CODE ANN. §
707A.2 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (1994); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:32.12 (1995); MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW, § 3-102 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204
(1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.329A (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (1998); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-49 (2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.021(2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1981); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1963); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE § 3795.02 (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 813 (1910); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.125 (1999); 18 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (1973); P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 33, § 4738 (2005); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37
(2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (1993); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (1994); VA. CODE § 8.01622.1 (2015); V.I. CODE, tit 14, § 2141 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (2011); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.12 (2001). Statutes in other states imply criminal prohibition of assisted suicide. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1997); D.C. CODE § 7-651.13 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.670 (1995); W. VA.
CODE § 16-30-15 (2000); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-107 (1985).
27. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294–95 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716 (1997) (“Though deeply rooted, the States’
assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed.”).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4.
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401.
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18(a) (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 672 (1983).
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revocation of the license.33 For example, in Minnesota “aiding suicide or aiding
attempted suicide” is “prohibited and is grounds for disciplinary action” even
without a criminal conviction, guilty plea, or other judgment under the assisted
suicide statute.34
While most states have only a “general” assisted suicide statute, six states
have enacted statutes that target MAID specifically. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Idaho, Ohio, and Rhode Island do not just outlaw assisted suicide. They expressly
outlaw MAID specifically.35 For example, Arkansas provides that “it is unlawful for
any physician or health care provider to commit the offense of physician-assisted
suicide by . . . prescribing any drug, compound, or substance to a patient with the
express purpose of assisting the patient to intentionally end the patient’s life.”36
Specifically targeting MAID in a penal statute eliminates any residual
uncertainty. It sends a clear, strong message to both patients and clinicians. Yet, this
degree of precision is probably unnecessary. Even broad, general assisted suicide
statutes probably also cover MAID.37 First, courts have specifically held that
criminal assisted suicide statutes cover MAID.38 Second, almost all legislative and
litigation efforts to legalize MAID have assumed that MAID is illegal. Moreover,
advocates imply (though certainly do not concede) MAID’s illegality by their efforts
to legalize it affirmatively. If the penal code does not now prohibit MAID, then why
do we need legislation to permit it?
Notably, during the 1980s and 1990s, clinicians were concerned that even
long-accepted treatment decisions like Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) orders and
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment might fall within the scope of
assisted suicide prohibitions.39 This fear of criminal liability is logical. “[W]hen lifesustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn, the patient’s death results from the
acts or omissions of those who have withheld or withdrawn treatment and those who
have authorized this conduct.”40 The Washington Supreme Court summed up the
reasoning this way:
Under Washington’s criminal code, homicide is “the killing of a human
being by the act, procurement or omission of another” and it is murder in the first
degree when, “with a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, [one]
causes the death of such person.” Thus, the potential for criminal liability for
withdrawing life-sustaining mechanisms appears to exist.41
33. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 21, § 12.04[C]; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-622.1(D) (2015);
In re Egbert, No. 2011-0870 (Md. State Bd. Physicians Dec. 12, 2014) (revoking physician license for
assisted suicide).
34. MINN. STAT. § 147.091(1)(w) (2017).
35. Assisted Suicide Ban Act, Ala. H.B. 96 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-106(b) (2007); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (2015); IDAHO CODE § 18-4017(1) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-16-04(1)
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE § 3795.04 (2003); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 (1996).
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-106(b)(1) (2007).
37. In addition, many states have enacted civil legislation that provides for the issuance of an
injunction, an award of damages, and attorneys’ fees. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 21, § 12.04[B].
38. See infra Part VII.
39. Cf. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d
404, 411 (N.J. 1987); In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886, 887 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
40. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 21, § 12.01.
41. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (internal citations omitted).
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To eliminate uncertainty or fear of criminal liability, many state legislatures
amended their healthcare decision-making acts to exclude such acts.42 For example,
the Virginia Code provides: “This section shall not apply to a . . . health care
[professional] who . . . withholds or withdraws life-prolonging procedures.”43
MAID statutes are designed to offer this same type of clear exemption. For
example, a 2017 New Mexico bill redefined “assisted suicide” to exclude “an
attending health care provider who provides medical aid in dying, in accordance with
the provisions of the End of Life Options Act, to an adult patient who has capacity
and who has a terminal illness.”44

IV. LEGALIZING MAID THROUGH STATUTE
Before 1990, there were few serious efforts to legalize MAID.45 After all,
policymakers were focusing their attention on other end-of-life medical decisionmaking issues. Specifically, during the 1970s and 1980s, courts and legislatures
across the country were still struggling with defining a right to die. They were
articulating a right to refuse 1960s medical technology such as CPR, mechanical
ventilation, and dialysis. By 1990, the patient’s “right to die” through passive refusal
was substantially settled.46 Therefore, policymakers turned their attention to active
means of hastening death like MAID.
Since the early 1990s, the most successful strategy for legalizing MAID has
been through enacting a statute. Six states have enacted nearly identical statutes.
These statutes have two types of distinctive features. First, they specify detailed
procedures for accessing life-ending medication. Second, they offer civil, criminal,
and disciplinary immunity for compliance.
Three key events accelerated the public policy discussion of MAID by
drawing massive academic and community attention to the issue. First, in January
1988, the Journal of the American Medical Association published a provocative oped. In It’s Over, Debbie, the anonymous physician author described administering a
lethal dose of morphine to a terminally ill patient.47 The article stimulated
“substantial reaction from the medical profession, the public, the media, and legal
authorities.”48

42. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 21, § 12.02[C][5].
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-622.1(E) (2015); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13(B)(1) (1997)
(“Death resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of health care in accordance with the Uniform
Health-Care Decisions Act does not for any purpose . . . constitute a suicide, a homicide or other crime.”).
44. H.B. 171, 53d Leg., 1st Sess., § 10 (N.M. 2017).
45. But cf. DEATH WITH DIGNITY An Inquiry into Related Public Issues: Hearing Before the
Special Committee on Aging: Hearings Before the Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
(1972).
46. The Supreme Court issued its decision in Cruzan decided on June 25, 1990. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
47. Name Withheld by Request, It’s Over, Debbie, 259(2) JAMA 272, 272 (1988).
48. George D. Lundberg, ‘It’s Over, Debbie’ and the Euthanasia Debate, 259(14) JAMA 2142, 2142
(1988).
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Second, in June 1990, Jack Kevorkian received enormous media attention
when he helped Janet Adkins commit suicide.49 Over the following three and a half
years, Kevorkian was present at the deaths of 20 other individuals.50 Michigan state
attorneys prosecuted him (unsuccessfully) four times.51 Through these and other
newsworthy events, Kevorkian received “international attention” and “provoked a
national discussion.”52 MAID pervaded the public consciousness.
Third, in 1991, Derek Humphry published Final Exit: The Practicalities of
Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying. This how-to guide for
terminally ill people who wish to kill themselves remained on the New York Times
bestseller list for 18 weeks.53 In short, both through high-profile publications and
through high profile, colorful advocates, the issue of MAID was placed squarely on
the public policy table by the early 1990s.

A. Very Early Efforts in the 1900s
Long before and wholly unconnected with contemporary efforts to legalize
MAID were several bills in the early 20th century.54 In 1906, the Ohio legislature
considered a bill titled “An Act Concerning Administration of Drugs etc. to Mortally
Injured and Diseased Persons.”55 The bill applied to “any person of lawful age and
of sound mind” who is “so ill of disease that recovery is impossible or who is
suffering great pain or torture.”56 If “three reputable physicians” concurred with the
patient’s request to “be put to death,” then clinicians could administer an anesthetic
until death ensures.57
That same year, Iowa considered a similar bill titled “A Bill for An Act
Requiring Physician to Take Human Life.”58 In 1937, Nebraska considered an even

49. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y. TIMES (June
6, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/06/us/doctor-tells-of-first-death-using-his-suicidedevice.html.
50. Silvia Sara Canetto & Janet D. Hollenshead, Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis
of the Kevorkian Cases, 1990–1997, 40(1) OMEGA - J. DEATH & DYING 165, 170–71 (2000).
51. Charles H. Baron, Assisted Dying: As the Population Ages, Assisted Suicide—With the Help of a
Physician or Loved One—Will Continue to be Controversial, 35-JUL TRIAL 44, 50 (1999). Kevorkian was
eventually convicted for active euthanasia, not MAID. See infra Section VIII.
52. Jack Kevorkian: How He Made Controversial History, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2011), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-13649381.
53. MICHAEL R. LEMING & GEORGE E. DICKINSON, UNDERSTANDING DYING, DEATH, AND
BEREAVEMENT 273 (Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 7th ed.).
54. These bills extended an earlier debate about the ethics of euthanasia. The most notable
contribution to that debate was Samuel Williams’ widely printed proposal in 1870. See Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, Whose Right to Die?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1997); see also Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The History of
Euthanasia Debates in the United States and Britain, 121(10) ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 793, 794 (1994).
55. See GIZA LOPES, DYING WITH DIGNITY: A LEGAL APPROACH TO ASSISTED DEATH 20 (2015)
(citing H.B. 145 (Ohio 1906)); Euthanasia, 8 ST. LOUIS MED. REV. 66, 66 (1906).
56. See id.
57. Jacob M. Appel, A Duty to Kill? A Duty to Die? Rethinking the Euthanasia Controversy of 1906,
78(3) BULLETIN HIST. MED. 610, 618 (2004).
58. See LOPES, supra note 55, at 21 (citing H.F. 367 (Iowa 1906)); see also DEMETRA M. PAPPAS,
THE EUTHANASIA/ASSISTED-SUICIDE DEBATE 444 (2012).
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broader MAID bill.59 All three of these Midwestern state bills were soundly defeated.
MAID legislation then entered a nearly fifty-year dormancy. Expectedly, interest in
this type of legislation waned after World War II.60 Euthanasia had become too
closely associated with Nazi eugenics and involuntary killing.

B. Early Efforts in the 1980s and 1990s
Interest in MAID reemerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a logical
extension of the then newly established right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
Initially, efforts to enact MAID statutes focused on the ballot initiative process.
Available in half the states, this process allows a public vote on a proposed statute
based on a petition signed by a certain minimum number of registered voters.61
Between 1988 and 1994, advocates proposed MAID ballot initiatives in California,
Washington, and Michigan.62
In 1988, California organizers did not get enough signatures to place the
“Humane and Dignified Death Act” on the ballot.63 Apparently, the inclusion of both
euthanasia and MAID dissuaded voters. Therefore, organizers later removed “mercy
killing” from the ballot language and required the patient to take the final overt at
causing death. They obtained enough signatures, and placed Proposition 161 on the
1992 ballot. Still, the initiative was defeated 54% to 46 percent.64 In 1991,
Washington placed Initiative 119 on the ballot. Like the California initiative, it was
also defeated 54 to 46 percent.65
In January 1994, Jack Kevorkian launched a petition drive to place MAID
on the November ballot in Michigan. Kevorkian’s petition offered an amendment to
the state constitution that read: “The right of competent adults, who are incapacitated
by incurable medical conditions, to voluntarily request and receive medical
assistance with respect to whether or not their lives continue, shall not be restrained
or abridged.”66 Like the 1988 California ballot initiative that similarly included both
MAID and euthanasia, Kevorkian’s effort did not obtain enough signatures.67

59. See IAN DOWBIGGIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA: LIFE, DEATH, GOD, AND MEDICINE
85 (2005); LOPES, supra note 55, at 48 n.14 (2015).
60. But cf. Morton L. Yanow, Letter to the Editor, Continue the Debate N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/27/opinion/l-continue-the-debate-335681.html (noting the Connecticut
Act to Legalize Euthanasia in 1959, the Idaho Voluntary Euthanasia Act in 1969 and the Oregon
Voluntary Euthanasia Act and the Montana Euthanasia Act in 1973). See also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO
SELF 367 (1986).
61. Initiative Process 101, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-process-101.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
62. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
63. SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL LAWS: EXAMINING CURRENT APPROACHES TO
SUICIDE IN POLICY AND LAW 138 (2016).
64. The California Propositions in Brief, LONG BEACH PRESS- TELEGRAM, Nov. 5, 1992, 1992
WLNR 1033302.
65. See Jane Gross, Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at A10.
66. Kevorkian Begins Ballot Drive for Suicide Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, http://www.
nytimes.com/1994/01/31/us/kevorkian-begins-ballot-drive-for-suicide-measure.html.
67. Kevorkian’s Ballot Drive on Suicide Aid Stumbles, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1994, http://www.
nytimes.com/1994/07/06/us/kevorkian-s-ballot-drive-on-suicide-aid-stumbles.html.
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C. Three Successful Ballot Initiatives
The earliest ballot initiative efforts in California, Washington, and
Michigan failed. Yet, three other ballot initiatives successfully passed. Oregon,
Washington, and Colorado all legalized MAID through the ballot initiative process.
Furthermore, other states have come very close, and more states are still trying to
emulate Oregon, Washington, and Colorado.

1. Oregon 1994 Ballot Initiative
Building off the earlier experience in California and Washington, Oregon
placed a ballot measure in the November 1994 election. In contrast to the earlier
ballot initiatives, the citizens of Oregon approved Measure 16 by a vote of 51 to 49
percent.68 Two factors leading to success included avoiding the term “mercy killing”
and reframing the legislation as the “Death with Dignity Act.”69
Before the Death with Dignity Act became effective, litigation delayed its
implementation for three years.70 Nevertheless, the delay did not dampen
enthusiasm. In November 1997, the margin of approval grew even wider when
Oregon citizens rejected a ballot measure to repeal the law 60 to 40 percent.71
Subsequently, while the Oregon Death with Dignity Act was the subject of several
(ultimately unsuccessful) federal challenges for years, it has remained in effect since
1998.72 Notably, once those federal challenges stopped in 2006, remaining “clouds”
of legal uncertainty lifted. Other states began more seriously to consider copying the
Oregon model.
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act is so carefully crafted, so narrowly
drawn, and so laden with procedural safeguards, that it may well demand more
energy and fortitude to comply with it than some terminally ill people are likely to
have.73 To qualify for “death with dignity,” a person must be a resident of the state,74
over age 18,75 “capable”76 (that is, in possession of decision-making capacity),77 and
suffering from a terminal disease that will lead to death within six months.78

68. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, OREGON HEALTH DIVISION, CENTER FOR DISEASE
PREVENTION AND EPIDEMIOLOGY, OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: THE FIRST YEAR’S
EXPERIENCE 1 (Feb. 18, 1999).
69. Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: The Progress of Glucksberg’s Invitation to
States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2008).
70. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 1994) (issuing preliminary injunction), 891
F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 1995) (issuing permanent injunction), vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d
1382 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1997) (lack of federal jurisdiction), cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 522
U.S. 927 (Oct. 14, 1997).
71. William Claiborne & Thomas B. Edsall, Oregon Suicide Law May Spur Movement, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/nov99/suicide6.htm.
72. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 21, § 12.06[A][1] (citing federal cases).
73. See Or. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 to .897 (1995). See also OR. ADMIN. R. 333-009-0000 to -0030
(2001).
74. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.805, .860.
75. Id. §§ 127.800, .805.
76. Id. § 127.805.
77. Id. § 127.800.
78. Id. § 127.805, .800.
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The patient must make one written79 and two oral requests80 for medication
to end his life. The written request must be “substantially in the form” provided in
the Act, signed, dated, witnessed by two persons, in the presence of the patient, who
attest that the patient is “capable, acting voluntarily, and not being coerced to sign
the request.”81 There are stringent qualifications as to who may act as a witness.82
The patient’s decision must be an “informed” one.83 Therefore, the
attending physician is obligated to provide the patient with information about the
diagnosis, prognosis, potential risks and probable consequences of taking the
medication to be prescribed, and alternatives, “including but not limited to, comfort
care, hospice care and pain control.”84 Another physician must confirm the diagnosis,
the patient’s decision-making capacity, and voluntariness of the patient’s decision.85
There are requirements for counseling, if either the attending or consulting physician
thinks the patient is further suffering from a mental disorder.86 There are
requirements for documentation in the patient’s medical record,87 for a waiting
period,88 for notification of the patient’s next of kin,89 and for reporting to state
authorities.90 The patient has a right to rescind the request for medication to end his
life at any time.91
Having complied with these requirements, the patient is entitled only to a
prescription for medication. The Act does not “authorize a physician or any other
person to end a patient’s life by lethal injection, mercy killing or active euthanasia.”92
In other words, the statute accepts MAID but rejects what the law calls active
euthanasia.
The Oregon legislature amended the Death with Dignity Act in 1999.93 The
definitional sections clarified that an “adult” is a person 18 years of age or older94
and that pharmacists fall within the definition of “health care provider.”95 The
amendments expanded and clarified the responsibilities of attending physicians. One
important added responsibility is to counsel patients “about the importance of having
another person present when the patient takes the medication . . . and of not taking
the medication in a public place. . . .”96 Some pharmacists have wished to refrain

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. § 127.805, .840.
Id. § 127.840, .897.
Id. §127.810.
Id.
Id. § 127.815, .830.
Id. § 127.815.
Id. § 127.820.
Id. § 127.825.
Id. § 127.855.
Id. § 127.850.
Id. § 127.835.
Id. § 127.865.
Id. § 127.845.
Id. § 127.880.
1999 Or. Laws 1098.
OR. REV. STAT. §127.800(1).
Id. §127.800(6).
Id. §127.815.
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from dispensing lethal prescriptions.97 In recognition of this, the legislation included
a provision in the Act expressly authorizing physicians to dispense the lethal
medications rather than having pharmacists do so.98
To address the concerns that have been raised that people will be motivated
by depression to seek a physician’s assistance in ending their lives, the 1999
amendments to the Act added “depression causing impaired judgment” to the generic
“psychiatric or psychological disorder” that the attending physician must determine
the patient does not have before medications may be prescribed.99
A concern about the original statute was that although its provisions were
limited to Oregon residents, there was no definition of “residence.” Thus, the 1999
amendments specified factors demonstrating Oregon residence.100 The amendments
also added an important new reporting requirement: any health care provider who
dispenses medication under the statute must file a copy of the dispensing record with
the state health division.101
Finally, the 1999 amendments included several provisions expanding
immunities. The Act now permits a health care provider to prohibit another health
care provider from participating in “death with dignity” on the premises of the first
health care provider if they gave prior notice of such prohibition.102 This is probably
the most far-reaching aspect of the amended legislation.
If a health care provider violates this prohibition, the provider issuing the
prohibition may impose sanctions including loss of medical staff privileges,
termination of a lease or other property contract, and termination of employment
contract.103 However, even if prohibited from doing so under one of the preceding
provisions, a health care provider may provide assistance under the statute if he does
so outside the course of employment.104
The Death with Dignity Act requires the state health division to issue an
annual report summarizing the experience with the statute.105 The statistics
summarized in these reports do not seem to bear out the fears of the opponents of
“death with dignity.” Individuals availing themselves of this statute were insured,
were disproportionately white rather than racial minorities, were better educated than
the general population, and were not disproportionately female.106 Individuals who
requested lethal prescriptions were concerned with loss of autonomy, their

97. See Jennifer Fass & Andrea Fass, Physician-assisted Suicide: Ongoing Challenges for
Pharmacists, 68(9) AM. J. HEALTH SYS. PHARMACISTS 846, 848 (2011).
98. See OR. REV. STAT. §127.815.
99. See id. §127.825.
100. Id. §127.860.
101. See id. §127.865; see also Or. Admin. R. 333-009-0000 to -0030 (2011) (regulations
implementing the reporting requirements).
102. OR. REV. STAT. §127.885; see also 49 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 161, No. 8264 (1999) (interpreting OR.
REV. STAT. §127.885).
103. OR. REV. STAT. §127.885.
104. Id.
105. See id. §127.865(3).
106. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OREGON HEALTH AUTH., OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT DATA
SUMMARY 2017 (Feb. 9, 2018); see also Barbara Coombs Lee, Oregon’s Experience with Aid in Dying:
Findings from the Death with Dignity Laboratory, ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 94, 96 (2014).
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decreasing ability to participate in activities that made their lives enjoyable, and loss
of bodily functions.107

2. Washington 2008 Ballot Initiative
Based on the thorough and virtually unblemished record from Oregon, other
states have followed. The first state to copy Oregon was its northern neighbor,
Washington. In November 2008, Washington State voters approved an initiative
modeled closely on Oregon’s law. Initiative 1000 passed by a 58 to 42 percent
margin.108 The Washington Death with Dignity Act became effective in early
2009.109 Data from Washington State’s annual published reports show operation and
usage very similar to that in Oregon.110

3. Colorado 2016 Ballot Initiative
In 2016, Colorado voters approved an initiative modeled closely on
Oregon’s law by a 65 to 35 percent margin.111 The Colorado End of Life Options Act
went into effect on December 16, 2016.112 Data from Colorado’s first annual report
is consistent with Oregon and Washington data.113

D. Three Successful Legislative Enactments
After Oregon and Washington legalized MAID through ballot initiatives in
1994 and 2008, many commentators thought that direct democracy voting was the
only viable path.114 They determined that the issue was just too controversial for the
political process. It turned out that this assessment was too pessimistic. Since 2013,
three states have legalized MAID through a legislative process: Vermont, California,
and Washington, DC. Furthermore, several other states have come close.

1. Vermont 2013 Legislation
In 2013, Vermont joined the list of states affirmatively approving the
practice of MAID, this time through legislation rather than a ballot initiative

107. Id.
108. Robert Steinbrook, Physician-Assisted Death — From Oregon to Washington State, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2513, 2513 (2008).
109. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010 to .220, 70.245.901 to .903 (effective Mar. 5, 2009); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-978-001 to -040 (2009). See generally Linda Ganzini & Anthony L. Back, The
Challenge of New Legislation on Physician-Assisted Death, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 427 (2016).
110. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, WASHINGTON STATE 2016 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT
REPORT (Sept. 2017).
111. Jennifer Brown, Colorado Passes Medical Aid in Dying, Joining Five Other States, DENVER
POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/08/colorado-aid-in-dying-proposition-106election-results.
112. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-48-101 to -123 (effective Dec. 16, 2016); 6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 10094 (effective June 14, 2017).
113. See Medical Aid in Dying, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH AND ENV’T, https://www.
colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/medical-aid-dying (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
114. But see GUENTER LEWY, ASSISTED DEATH IN EUROPE AND AMERICA: FOUR REGIMES AND THEIR
LESSONS 127 (Oxford Univ. Press) (2011) (Oregon State Senator Frank Roberts introduced legislation in
1987, 1989, and 1991).
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process.115 Uniquely, as originally enacted, the Vermont MAID law would have
diverged from those in California, Oregon, and Washington after July 1, 2016. As
originally enacted, on that day, the section of the Vermont statute imposing stringent
procedural safeguards would sunset.116 In 2015, the Vermont legislature repealed
that sunset provision.117 Like the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, opponents attacked
the Vermont law in court.118 Those challenges have been unsuccessful.

2. California 2015 Legislation
On October 5, 2015, California became the fourth state to enact a statute
allowing physicians to prescribe terminally ill patients medication to end their
lives.119 The California End of Life Option Act is virtually identical to MAID statutes
in Oregon, Washington, and Vermont. 120 Still, unlike the other MAID statutes, the
California law will sunset on January 1, 2026.121 The first published report from
California shows operation and usage very similar to that in Oregon and
Washington.122
Finally, reminiscent of the post-statute litigation in Oregon and Vermont,
physicians and advocacy groups filed suit to enjoin the operation of the California
statute, arguing that the law was unconstitutional for a variety of reasons.123 The
court refused to enjoin operation of the law, but also refused to dismiss the case.124

3. Washington, DC 2017 Legislation
In 2017, the District of Columbia enacted a statute also modeled closely on
Oregon’s law.125 Just as there was federal interference with the Oregon legislation,
there has also been federal interference with the D.C. legislation. Given the District
of Columbia’s unique status in the federal system, Congress sought to exert its
authority to disapprove the law. Nevertheless, the D.C. law became effective in
February 2017, after Congress failed to pass a “resolution of disapproval.”126 In

115. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5293 (effective May 20, 2013). See Kathryn L. Tucker,
Vermont’s Patient Choice at End of Life Act: A Historic “Next Generation” Law Governing Aid in Dying,
38 VT. L. REV. 687, 687 (2014).
116. 2013 Vt. Acts & Resolves 292, 296.
117. 2015 Vt. Acts & Resolves 296.
118. Vt. All. for Ethical Healthcare, Inc., v. Hoser, 2017 WL 1284815 (D. Vt. Apr. 5, 2017); see also
Vt. All. for Ethical Healthcare, Inc., v. Hoser, 2016 WL 7015717 (D. Vt. Dec. 1. 2016).
119. Assemb. B 15, Stats. 2015, Ch.1 (2015).
120. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.1 to 443.22 (effective June 9, 2016).
121. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.215 (2016) (“This part shall remain in effect only until
January 1, 2026, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before January
1, 2026, deletes or extends that date.”).
122. See CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA END OF LIFE OPTION ACT 2016 DATA REPORT
(2017).
123. Ahn v. Hestrin, No. RIC-1607135 (Riverside Cnty. Sup. Ct., Cal. June 8, 2016) (Complaint).
124. Ahn v. Kestrich, No. RIC-1607135 (Riverside Cnty. Sup. Ct., Cal. June 9, 2017) (Order denying
preliminary injunction but allowing lawsuit to proceed).
125. D.C. Act 21-577 (Dec. 19, 2016).
126. H.R.J. Res. 27, 115th Cong. (2017). The law went into effect in February 2017 after Congress
failed to pass resolution of disapproval within 30 legislative days after the city government passed the
law.
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September 2017, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would repeal the
D.C. Death with Dignity Act.127

E. Other Notable Efforts to Enact MAID Statutes
By the end of 2017, only Oregon, Colorado, and Washington have
successfully passed ballot initiatives. Yet, other states have come very close. For
example, a 2012 Massachusetts ballot initiative failed on a 49 to 51 percent vote.128
Similarly, a 2000 Maine ballot initiative also failed on a 49 to 51 percent vote.129 A
1998 Michigan ballot initiative did not do as well, failing on a 71 to 29 percent
vote.130 Additional states are continuing to explore the ballot initiative process to
legalize MAID.131
By the end of 2017, only California, Vermont, and Washington, DC have
enacted legislation. Yet, other states have come very close. For example, in 2017,
the Hawaii Senate passed a MAID bill on a vote of 22 to 3. The Hawaii House later
deferred the bill.132 Also in 2017, the Maine Senate passed a MAID bill that died in
the House.133 Likewise, in 2015 the Maine Senate passed a bill that died in the
House.134 In 2016, the New Jersey Assembly passed a MAID bill on a vote of 41 to
28. That bill even then passed a key Senate committee.135 As in Maine, this was not
the first time that legislation advanced in New Jersey. In 2014, the Assembly passed
a bill by a vote of 41 to 31.136
Recent near successes in Hawaii and Maine are not the only reason to expect
more states to legalize MAID. First, nearly half of the states considered MAID
legislation in 2016 and 2017.137 Second, proponents are introducing more and more
bills in more and more states. Third, today, there is more support from the public,
healthcare professionals, medical societies and medical associations.138

127. H.R. 3354, 115th Cong. § 818 (2017); J. Portnoy, House Votes to Repeal D.C.’s Death with
Dignity Law; Senate Has Yet to Act, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2017.
128. See Carolyn Johnson, Assisted Suicide Measure Narrowly Defeated; Supporters Concede Defeat,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2012.
129. Michael Moore, Suicide Opponents Claim Win, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2000).
130. 1998 Michigan Election Results, MICH. DEP’T OF ST., http://miboecfr.nictusa.com/election/
results/98gen/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
131. See, e.g., Voters May See Cannabis, Tobacco Tax on South Dakota Ballot, ARGUS LEADER, Nov.
6, 2017. Some states have considered ballot initiatives not only to enact a MAID statute but also to amend
the state constitution.
132. See S.B. 1129, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017).
133. See Legis. Doc. 347, 128th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2017).
134. See Legis. Doc. 1270, 127th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2015).
135. Assemb. B. 2451, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2016).
136. Assemb. B. 2270, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014).
137. Two public websites appear to collect state-by-state legislation comprehensively and accurately.
DEATH WITH DIGNITY NATIONAL CENTER, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2018); PATIENT RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/laws-issues-bystate/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
138. See COMPASSION & CHOICES, supra note 12; Michael Ollove, Aid in Dying Gains Momentum as
Erstwhile Opponents Change their Minds, STATELINE, (Mar. 9, 2018), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/09/aid-in-dying-gains-momentum-as-erstwhileopponents-change-their-minds.
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V. LEGALIZING MAID THROUGH FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
While the most successful method of legalizing MAID has been by enacting
statutes, the most prominent early method was by seeking a right under the U.S.
Constitution. During the 1990s, physician and patient plaintiffs brought several cases
in state and federal courts. Several even sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme
Court. That court ultimately agreed to adjudicate the issue. In 1997, the Court ruled
that state criminalization of MAID does not violate constitutional due process or
equal protection rights.139

A. Early Efforts before 1997
Before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decisions in June 1997, four other
courts had already ruled that there was no federal constitutional right to MAID.

1. Donaldson v. Lundgren (Cal. App. 1992)
The earliest case was not a typical MAID case. Indeed, it was so unusual
that it was not really a MAID case at all. Mathematician and computer software
scientist, Thomas Donaldson, suffered from an incurable brain disease. He wanted
to cryogenically preserve his body in hopes that sometime in the future, when a cure
for his disease is found, his body may be brought “back to life.”140 Since the process
would require Donaldson’s death, the court interpreted the request for declaratory
and injunctive relief for “pre-mortem cryogenic suspension” as seeking a right to
assisted suicide. The trial court dismissed the action and the court of appeals
affirmed.141

2. State v. Kevorkian (Mich. 1994)
Jack Kevorkian was one of the most prolific litigants in the MAID
movement. Most of his lawsuits were criminal prosecutions and not actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief like most other cases discussed in this article. Yet,
in at least one of these cases, Kevorkian raised constitutional arguments before the
Michigan Supreme Court.
In February 1993, the Michigan legislature enacted a ban on assisted
suicide. Kevorkian challenged that statute both in defense to criminal prosecutions

139. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Coincidentally, the same year that the U.S.
Supreme Court found no constitutional right to MAID, the Constitutional Court in Colombia found there
was such a right. Mariana Parreiras Reis de Castro et al., Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Western
Countries: A Systematic Review, 24(2) REV. BIOETHICS 355 (2016); see also Carter v. Canada, [2015]
S.C.R. 331 (Can.).
140. Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 60 (Ct. App. 1992). The television series, LA Law,
dramatized the case. LA Law: The Good Human Bar, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Rzpda6cpYQU.
141. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59. The court rejected claims under both the U.S. Constitution and
the California Constitution. Id.
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and in an action for declaratory relief.142 Kevorkian met with some success at the
trial level. In 1994, the Court of Appeals consolidated those several cases. The
appellate court then overturned the new statute outlawing assisted suicide. While the
court did not hold that there was a constitutional right to assisted suicide, it held that
the statute violated a provision in the Michigan Constitution that “no law shall
embrace more than one object.”143
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, upholding the assisted suicide
statute. It held that the act was not constitutionally defective for having more than
one object. Like the court of appeals, the state supreme court denied that the
Fourteenth Amendment included a constitutional right to die.144 The court held that
there was a valid distinction between the right to refuse life-continuing treatment and
the right to insist on life-ending treatment.

3. Kevorkian v. Arnett (C.D. Cal. 1996)
While most of Kevorkian’s cases were in Michigan state courts, he had two
in federal court. He filed one in Los Angeles.145 There, he asserted claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause and the Equal Protection clause. He also
asserted privacy and equal protection claims under the California Constitution.
Notably, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California decided the
case after the favorable federal appellate decisions in Glucksberg and Quill.146
Nevertheless, the court still denied all of Kevorkian’s claims.147 The Ninth Circuit
dismissed the appeal because by then the U.S. Supreme Court had already
adjudicated the issues in other cases.148

4. Kevorkian v. Thompson (E.D. Mich. 1997)
Kevorkian filed his second federal action in Michigan with Janet Good, a
patient with terminal pancreatic cancer.149 Like the California federal court, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan declined to follow the stillstanding federal appellate decisions in Glucksberg and Quill.150 The court held that
a mentally competent, terminally ill or intractably suffering adult does not have a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in
MAID. The court further held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not violated by denying a mentally competent, terminally ill or
intractably suffering adult not on life support the right to MAID.
142. See Janet M. Branigan, Michigan’s Struggle with Assisted Suicide and Related Issues as
Illuminated by Current Case Law: An Overview of People v. Kevorkian, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 959
(1995).
143. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Mich. App. 1994).
144. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
145. Kevorkian v. Arnett, 939 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1996).
146. See infra Sections V.B & V.C.
147. See Kevorkian, 939 F. Supp., at 731–732. The court also rejected an asserted right under the
California constitution, citing Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992). Id.
148. Kevorkian v. Arnett, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 1998) (vacating judgment and dismissing
appeal).
149. Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 1997).
150. See infra Sections V.B & V.C.
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B. SCOTUS 1: Quill v. Vacco
During the early 1990s, several cases in California and Michigan had sought
a federal constitutional right to MAID. Still, the most notable constitutional rights
cases were out of Washington and New York. In 1994, advocates filed two federal
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of Washington and New York statutes
criminalizing aiding suicide.
The Washington and New York lawsuits claimed that criminal assisted
suicide statutes constituted denials of due process and equal protection as applied to
terminally ill, competent persons voluntarily requesting assistance from licensed
physicians. These claims met some success. In both cases, federal courts of appeals
upheld the claims and held the statutes unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no constitutional barrier to states
criminalizing MAID.
The specific question presented in the Second Circuit case was whether
New York’s ban on MAID violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.151 The plaintiffs alleged that the law treats similarly situated terminally ill
patients disparately. On the one hand, New York law (like laws in almost every state)
allows competent terminally ill adults to hasten their death by withholding or
withdrawing their own lifesaving treatment. On the other hand, New York law denies
the same right to patients who could not withdraw their own treatment even if they
are terminally ill or in great pain.
The District Court rejected these claims and ruled for the State of New
York.152 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that New York’s ban was
unconstitutional.153 The court of appeals held that the statute treated similarly
situated terminally ill patients differently. On the one hand, those who required lifesustaining treatment were entitled under New York law to die by having that
treatment withheld or withdrawn. On the other hand, patients whose suffering might
be equal or greater, but who did not require life-sustaining treatment, were denied
the same right to die because New York statutory law made it a crime to provide
them with the assistance necessary to die.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no fundamental
liberty interest and that New York’s distinction between active and passive means of
death was legitimate. Having determined that there was no fundamental right at
stake, the Court needed only to apply a minimal scrutiny test and was able to accord
the statute a strong presumption of validity. Thus, the Court would uphold the law
so long as it bore a rational relation to some legitimate end.
Employing a rationality test to examine the guarantees of the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court held that New York’s ban bore a rational relationship
to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, preventing euthanasia,
shielding the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice that might encourage them
to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life. Moreover, while
acknowledging the difficulty of its task, the Court distinguished between the refusal
of lifesaving treatment and assisted suicide, by noting that the latter involves the
151. Quill v. Vacco, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
152. Quill v. Vacco, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
153. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718 (2d Cir. 1996).

286

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48; No. 2

criminal elements of causation and intent. It found the distinction between assisting
suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment to be a rational one because it is
“a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our
legal traditions.”154

C. SCOTUS 2: Washington v. Glucksberg
While the New York case presented an equal protection question, a parallel
case from Washington State presented the question whether Washington State’s ban
on MAID violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs
alleged that the same principle that grounded the right to refuse treatment also
encompassed a right to choose the time and manner of one’s death. Therefore, they
argued, Washington’s law denied competent terminally ill adults this fundamental
liberty.
The District Court ruled for the plaintiffs.155 While a three-judge panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,156 a rare en banc Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court.157 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the state of Washington, and upheld the constitutionality of the state law.158
The Supreme Court concluded that no fundamental right was at stake. It
further concluded that the state’s interests were legitimate and that the statute bore a
rational relationship to furthering those interests. Accordingly, the Court held that
the Washington statute making assisted suicide a crime “does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or as applied to competent, terminally ill
adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their
doctors.”159

D. Later Efforts after 1997
By June 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected both due process and
equal protection arguments. Nevertheless, some litigants continued to press such
claims in federal courts. Predictably, those courts denied the claims.
1. Mahorner v. Florida (M.D. Fla. 1998)
Unlike the patient plaintiffs in most other MAID lawsuits, James Mahorner
was not terminally ill. Instead, the seventy-six-year-old former practicing attorney
was suffering increasing “diminished mental capacity.”160 Mahorner sought judicial
approval to “hire a physician to inject him with ‘a lethal pain-relieving’ drug to
hasten his demise.”161 The court expectedly held that to the extent that the complaint

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
2008).
161.

Quill, 521 U.S. at 800.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 1994).
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995).
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 1996) (en banc).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 732.
See Mahorner v. Florida, No. 3:08-cv-300-J-33TEM, 2008 WL 2756481 (M.D. Fla. July 14,
See id. Technically, the plaintiff was seeking active euthanasia and not MAID.
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sought relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, it was subject to dismissal under
Glucksberg, Vacco, and Krischer.162
2. Calon v. United States (D. Kan. 2009)
In 1999, John Calon asserted a constitutional right to MAID in a claim for
benefits before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.163 That court held
that Calon could not state a cognizable claim that state laws prohibiting MAID
violated the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection
Clause. The court further ruled that any other constitutional claim challenging state
laws regarding assisted suicide was too vague to confer federal question jurisdiction.
Nearly ten years later, Calon made similar claims in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas.164 He asserted various violations of federal law, including
the First, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Yet, Calon did not assert any such claims in his complaint. Nor did he
allege sufficient facts to allege a real and immediate threat of injury to support any
claim for prospective relief.

VI. LEGALIZING MAID THROUGH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
Because the U.S. Supreme Court decided that there is no constitutional right
to MAID, litigation efforts after June 1997 have focused elsewhere.165 Specifically,
they have focused either on grounding the right in state constitutions or on
establishing that MAID falls outside the scope of assisted suicide statutes. This
section examines cases asserting state constitutional claims. The next section
examines cases asserting statutory interpretation claims.
Initially, advocates identified the most promising theories to be state
constitutional privacy claims. After all, some state supreme courts had previously
given rather expansive readings to the privacy clauses in their state constitutions.
Nonetheless, the courts have proved unwilling to strike down criminal prohibitions
on assisted suicide as a violation of a terminally ill person’s right to privacy.
Admittedly, some plaintiffs have obtained favorable state constitutional
judgments from trial courts.166 Yet, no plaintiff has ever obtained an appellate court
ruling that the prohibition of MAID violates a right afforded by state constitution.
Indeed, “not a single plaintiff has asserted a successful constitutional challenge to an
assisted suicide ban.”167

162. See supra Sections V.B-C & infra Section VI.A.2.
163. Calon v. Apfel, No. 98-3190, 1999 WL 415340, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 26,1999).
164. Calon v. United States, No. 08–2608–JWL, 2009 WL 248430 (D. Kan. Feb 3, 2009) (dismissing
for lack of jurisdiction).
165. Litigation has appeared an attractive pathway, because ballot initiatives are cumbersome and
legislation is controversial. See Alan Meisel, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Common Law Roadmap for
State Courts, 24 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 817, 819 (1997).
166. See discussion of the state constitutional litigation in Florida, Montana, and New Mexico infra
Section VI.A.2, 4, 5
167. Myers v. Schneiderman, 85 N.E.3d 57, 92 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017) (Garcia, J., concurring).
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A. State Supreme Court Rulings
Six constitutional rights cases have reached the state supreme courts in
Michigan, Florida, Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, and New York. I discuss those
six cases immediately below. In the next section, I discuss constitutional rights cases
decided by trial courts or intermediate appellate courts.

1. Michigan v. Kevorkian (Mich. 1994)
In February 1993, the Michigan legislature enacted a ban on assisted
suicide. Kevorkian challenged that statute both in defense to criminal prosecutions
and in an action for declaratory relief.168 Several circuit court judges held that MAID
was a constitutional right.169 As discussed above, neither the intermediate court of
appeals nor the Michigan Supreme Court found there was a federal constitutional
right.170
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals overturned the new statute outlawing
assisted suicide on state constitutional grounds. While the court did not hold that
there was a constitutional right to assisted suicide, it held that the statute violated a
provision in the Michigan Constitution that “no law shall embrace more than one
object.”171 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, upholding the assisted suicide
statute. It held that the act was not constitutionally defective for having more than
one object. Like the court of appeals, the state supreme court denied that the
Fourteenth Amendment included a constitutional right to die.172

2. Krischer v. McIver (Fla. 1997)
Charlie Hall was terminally ill with AIDS. Along with his physician, Hall
sought a declaratory judgment that Florida’s assisted suicide statute was
unconstitutional as applied to MAID. Hall contended that Florida’s statutory
prohibition on assisted suicide violated the state constitutional right of privacy.173
The trial court rejected the fundamental liberty interest but accepted the equal
protection argument and enjoined the attorney general.174
The Florida Supreme Court reversed.175 The court held there was no
fundamental right and that there were compelling state interests in any case. The
court’s analysis was a straightforward rejection of the application of the
168. See Janet M. Branigan, Michigan’s Struggle with Assisted Suicide and Related Issues as
Illuminated by Current Case Law: An Overview of People v. Kevorkian, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 959,
962 (1995).
169. See, e.g., Hobbins v. Attorney General, No. 93-306-178CZ, 1993 WL 276833 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
May 20, 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 1994), rev’d sub
nom. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. December 13, 1994).
170. See discussion supra Section V.A.2.
171. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting MICH.
CONST. art. 4, §24) rev’d sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
172. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994), cert denied sub nom. Hobbins v.
Kelley, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
173. FLA. CONST. art. I, §23; see also Eryn R. Ace, Krischer v. Mciver: Avoiding the Dangers of
Assisted Suicide, 32 AKRON L. REV. 723, 724 (1999).
174. See McIver v. Kirscher, No. CL-96-1504-AF, 1997 WL 225878 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997).
175. See Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
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constitutional privacy provision to permit terminally ill patients to obtain the aid of
physicians in actively ending their lives. Central to the holding was the court’s
acceptance of the conventional distinction between passive and active means of
dying, reaffirming its commitment to the former while rejecting the latter.
The Florida Supreme Court followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in
Glucksberg in finding that important state interests justify the differential treatment
of actively and passively hastening death. Specifically, the court held that “three of
the four recognized state interests are so compelling as to clearly outweigh Mr. Hall’s
desire for assistance in committing suicide” 176 These interests are preserving life,177
preventing suicide,178 and protecting the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.179

3. Sampson v. Alaska (Alaska 2001)
In 1998, a patient with breast cancer and a patient with AIDS sought a
declaratory judgment that Alaska’s assisted suicide statute was unconstitutional as
applied to MAID. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. The Alaska Supreme
Court affirmed. The court held there was no fundamental right and that the state had
a rational basis for prohibiting MAID. The court also denied the equal protection
claim holding that the active passive distinction was valid. Furthermore, the court
concluded that this was a “quintessentially legislative matter” and it would not make
social policy.180
The Alaska Supreme Court found that, “[t]o the extent that the . . . statute’s
general prohibition of assisted suicide prevents terminally ill patients from seeking
a physician’s help in ending their lives, . . . the provision substantially interferes with
[patients’] general privacy and liberty interests, as guaranteed by the Alaska
Constitution.”181 Nevertheless, the court determined that the state’s ban on such
assistance, through its manslaughter statute, was constitutional because it both served
a legitimate governmental purpose and bore a substantial relationship to that
purpose.182
The court also expressed concern that permitting assisted suicide in cases
involving competent, terminally ill patients would put courts in difficult positions in
terms of determining competency and terminal condition.183 Finally, the court
seemed concerned that permitting assisted suicide in the case of competent patients
would open the door to assisted suicide by advance directive.184

176. McIver, 697 So. 2d at 103.
177. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
178. Id. (“[L]egal physician-assisted suicide could make it more difficult for the State to protect
depressed or mentally ill persons, or those who are suffering from untreated pain, from suicidal
impulses.”).
179. Id. at 104.
180. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 98 (Alaska Sept. 21, 2001).
181. Id. at 95.
182. Id. at 95–96.
183. Id. at 97–98.
184. Id. at 97.
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4. Baxter v. State (Mont. 2009)
In December 2008, a Montana trial court ruled that the Montana
Constitution protected MAID.185 While the trial court rejected the equal protection
argument, it accepted the privacy and dignity argument. The court also found there
were no compelling state interests requiring the state to treat MAID as homicide. As
discussed below, the Montana Supreme Court resolved the right to MAID at the
statutory level, obviating the need to resolve the constitutional question.186

5. Morris v. Brandenburg (N.M. 2016)
In early 2014, a trial court in New Mexico invalidated that state’s statutory
prohibition on MAID, ruling that it violated the provision of the New Mexico
constitution guaranteeing not only “the rights of enjoying life and liberty” but also
“the right to seek and obtain happiness.”187
In 2015, the intermediate court of appeals reversed that judgment.188 In
2016, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the
trial court ruling.189 While agreeing that New Mexico could grant its citizens more
constitutional rights than those guaranteed by the federal Constitution, the court
followed the reasoning of Glucksberg. The court held there was no “special
characteristic of New Mexico law that makes physician aid in dying a fundamental
right in this state.”190 In doing so, it refused to hold that United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence had moved beyond “the careful substantive due process approach
announced in Glucksberg, effectively overruling it.”191
Finally, the court interpreted Article II, Section 4 (the Inherent Rights
Clause) of the New Mexico Constitution as creating no judicially enforceable rights
but instead guaranteeing New Mexicans an expansive view of rights otherwise
existing in its constitution. While the portion of New Mexico’s Constitution that
refers to “seeking and obtaining . . . happiness” might, under other circumstances,
ensure greater due process protections that those of the federal government, “the
Inherent Rights Clause has never been interpreted to be the exclusive source for a
fundamental or important constitutional right, and on its own has always been subject
to reasonable regulation.”192
The court ruled that the New Mexico statute bore a rational relationship to
the legitimate governmental interest in “providing positive protection to ensure that
a terminally ill patient’s end-of-life decision is informed, independent, and
procedurally safe.” Setting forth such procedures is a job for the legislature, not the
judiciary. The New Mexico legislature can and should draw the line between the
185. Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
186. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1220 (Mont. 2009).
187. Morris v. Brandenburg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672986, at *6–7 (2d Jud. D. Ct.
N.M., Jan. 13, 2014) (citing to N.M. CONST. art. II, §4) rev’d Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100,
356 P.3d 564, aff’d, Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d 836.
188. See Morris, 2015-NMCA-100 (decided Aug. 11, 2015).
189. See Morris, 2016-NMSC-027 (decided June 30, 2016).
190. Id. ¶ 36.
191. Id. ¶ 23 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2620–21 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
192. Id. ¶ 51.
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state’s legitimate interest and the state’s conceded lack of “interest in preserving a
painful and debilitating life that will end imminently.”193

6. Myers v. Schneiderman (N.Y. 2017)
Constitutional litigation in New York turned out no better than in New
Mexico. The Appellate Division dismissed plaintiffs’ state equal protection claim
quickly, saying that the right to equal protection under the New York Constitution
was coextensive with the right under the United States Constitution, and the Supreme
Court in Vacco v. Quill had already decided that issue. The Appellate Division also
rejected arguments that a strong liberty interest existed for due process purposes. The
court refused to alter its constitutional analysis based on evidence amassed over the
two decades since Vacco and Glucksberg. “We are not persuaded . . . aid-in-dying is
an issue where a legitimate consensus has formed. . . . we defer to the political
branches of government. . . . ”194
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that applying New York’s statutes
criminalizing assisted suicide to MAID violated neither due process nor equal
protection rights under the New York state constitution. “Although New York has
long recognized a competent adult’s right to forgo life-saving medical care, we reject
plaintiffs’ argument that an individual has a fundamental constitutional right to aidin-dying as they define it. We also reject plaintiffs’ assertion that the State’s
prohibition on assisted suicide is not rationally related to legitimate state
interests.”195

B. Baxter v. Montana (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. 2008)
As with lower courts in Florida and New Mexico, Montana plaintiffs were
able to obtain a trial court judgment that Montana’s prohibition of MAID violated
patients’ privacy, and dignity rights under the state constitution.196 In December
2008, the Montana First Judicial District Court ruled that the state constitution
protected MAID.197 Yet, as discussed below, the Montana Supreme Court vacated
the judgment.198 That court found a right to MAID at the statutory level, obviating
the need to resolve the constitutional question.199
The plaintiff argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the Montana
Constitution’s equal protection clause, individual dignity clause, and express right
of privacy. The trial court ruled that the statute did not violate the state constitution’s
equal protection clause for the same reasons the United States Supreme Court had
ruled to that effect with respect to the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.

193. Id.
194. Myers v. Schneiderman, 140 A.D. 3d 51, 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
195. Myers v. Schneiderman, 85 N.E.3d 57, 65 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017) (decided Sept. 7, 2017).
196. See Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5,
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009) (holding that the prohibition violated
MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 10).
197. Id.
198. See infra Section VII.A.
199. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1220 (Mont. 2009). One Justice wrote separately to express
agreement with the trial court’s reasoning on the constitutional issue. Id. at 1223.
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Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional, holding that
the state constitution’s individual dignity clause and right of privacy combined to
“mandate that a competent terminally ill person has the right to choose to end his or
her life.” 200
Moreover, the right necessarily includes a right to have the assistance of a
physician, for if a patient were forced to proceed without physician assistance he
might end his life “sooner rather than later . . . and the manner of the patient’s death
would more likely occur in a manner that violates his dignity and peace of mind.”201
The trial court then considered the state interests that Montana had
advanced to convince the court that the statute was constitutional. The state asserted
an interest in the preservation of life. The court ruled that such an interest is
compelling in general, but “diminishes in the delicate balance against the
individual’s constitutional rights of privacy and individual dignity” when a patient is
terminally ill.202
The court ruled that the state did have compelling state interests in
“protecting vulnerable groups from potential abuses” and “protecting the integrity
and ethics of the medical profession.” Yet the court held the statute unconstitutional
despite the existence of these compelling state interests because it was overbroad.
The court suggested that the state of Montana should seek to serve these compelling
state interests by enacting statutory protections such as those contained within
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act rather than by prohibiting suicide assistance as a
blanket matter, sweeping within the reach of its statutes decisions of competent,
terminally ill patients choosing to end their own lives with the assistance of
physicians.203

C. Other Court Rulings
While only six state supreme courts have analyzed the constitutionality of
MAID under state constitutions, seven other trial and intermediate appellate have
also adjudicated state constitutional claims. Trial courts in Florida, Montana, and
New Mexico ruled that prohibition of MAID violated state constitutional rights. Yet,
no appellate court sustained those judgments. Nearly fifteen other trial and appellate
courts to reach the issue all found that there was no state constitutional right to
MAID.
Two California cases asserted both federal and state constitutional claims.
The adjudication of the federal claims is discussed above.204 The state claims fared
no better. First, Thomas Donaldson brought claims under both the U.S. Constitution
and the California Constitution. Both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal
denied the states claims just as they denied the federal claims.205 Second, Jack
Kevorkian brought claims under both the U.S. Constitution and the California

200. Baxter, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, at *26. The court recognized that the state may want to
erect some safeguards but could do so afterwards. Id. at *29.
201. Id. at *29.
202. Id. at *30.
203. See id. at *15.
204. See supra Section V.A.
205. See Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 59, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1992).
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Constitution. The U.S. District Court denied the states claims just as it denied the
federal claims.206

1. Sanderson v. Colorado (Colo. App. 2000)
The MAID issue in Sanderson differed significantly from that in other
cases. Robert Sanderson was an 81-year-old former judge. Although in good health,
Sanderson wanted to execute an advance directive authorizing his wife “to end his
life by euthanasia, provided that two physicians agree his medical condition is
hopeless.”207 He sought a declaratory judgment to assure himself that neither his wife
nor the physician who actually engaged in the euthanasia would be subject to
criminal liability.
Sanderson asserted claims under several federal constitutional provisions,
but on appeal after dismissal of the complaint, he pursued only a claim under the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment. Sanderson described his personal religious
beliefs as including beliefs that the free will of man included an ability to direct
euthanasia, and that man could delegate to another to authorize euthanasia.
The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the free exercise clause did not
exempt the plaintiffs from the state law criminalizing their conduct, in large part
because the law was an “‘across-the-board’ criminal prohibition on a particular form
of conduct.” Because Colorado’s prohibition of assisted suicide fell into this
category, the court ruled, it constituted a “valid, religiously-neutral, and generallyapplicable criminal statute that prohibits conduct a state is free to regulate.”208
In addition to its unique First Amendment argument, Sanderson is
interesting, and differs from the other cases, in that the plaintiff was asserting a right
to choose death through an advance directive rather than a right to commit suicide
with assistance. Thus, the plaintiff was arguing that, while competent, he could direct
others to euthanize him later, when he was incompetent. Rather than asserting his
own right to take action, Sanderson sought to authorize others to take action, and he
wanted to ensure that the state would not prosecute those who acted at his request.
The court noted the incongruity by describing his claim as weak, because
he does not just seek a limited exemption from the assisted suicide statute for himself
so that he may freely practice his religion without fear of criminal prosecution. He
also seeks exemptions for third parties—his wife and his physician—based on his
personal religious beliefs, which they may not share. Even assuming Sanderson had
standing to raise such claims on behalf of third persons, the court found “no
precedent for such a broad application of the Free Exercise Clause in First

206. See Kevorkian v. Arnett, 939 F. Supp. 725, 731–32 (C.D. Cal. 1996), vacated, appeal dismissed,
Kevorkian v. Arnett, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir. 1998).
207. See Sanderson v. People, 12 P.3d 851 (Colo. App. June 8, 2000); see also Allison Sherry, ExJudge Seeks Right to Die, DENVER POST (June 9, 2000), www.extras.denverpost.com/news/
news0609.htm (explaining that Sanderson was in good health despite his interest in the medical aid in
dying cause).
208. Sanderson, 12 P.3d at 854.
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Amendment jurisprudence.”209 The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the
case.210

2. People v. Kevorkian (Mich. App. 2001)
In 1999, a Michigan jury convicted Jack Kevorkian of second-degree
murder and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.211 Kevorkian appealed. 212
He contended that his conviction was unlawful under the Ninth and the Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as under their counterparts in the
Michigan Constitution.213
The Ninth Amendment provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”214 Dr. Kevorkian claimed that the “right to be free from inexorable pain and
suffering must be among” the rights so protected.215 The court summarily rejected
this argument because of Kevorkian’s failure to pursue it beyond its mere assertion.
The court dealt far more extensively, however, with Dr. Kevorkian’s
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests argument. Using the U.S. Supreme Court’s
assisted-suicide jurisprudence as a base, Kevorkian argued that the “necessary and
direct corollary” of the concern expressed in Quill about patients dying in pain was
“that a person should not be forced to suffer unbearably.”216 While acknowledging
the Supreme Court’s concerns about pain, the court refused to rule that it was
unconstitutional to apply Michigan’s murder statute to active euthanasia based on
those concerns.
The court articulated three bases for its ruling. First, the court expressed a
concern that “expanding the right to privacy would begin, as the steps in the
progression of defendant’s argument supporting voluntary euthanasia clearly
indicate, the slide down the slippery slope toward euthanasia.”217 Second, the court
hesitated to take such a step because it believed that “[i]f society is to recognize a
right to be free from intolerable and irremediable suffering, it should do so through
the action of the majority of the legislature, whose role it is to set social policy, or by
action of the people through ballot initiative.”218

209. Id.
210. See id. (indicating that certiorari was denied on October 23, 2000 due to an unsuccessful attempt
at making a first amendment challenge); cf. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. Georgia, 722 S.E. 2d 722, 725
(Ga. 2012) (making a successful first amendment challenge); see also State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844
N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 2014), rev’g 816 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (succeeding on first
amendment grounds).
211. See Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian Sentenced to 10 to 25 Years in Prison, N.Y. Times, (Apr. 14, 1999)
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/14/us/kevorkian-sentenced-to-10-to-25-years-in-prison.html.
212. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 296 (Mich. App. 2001).
213. See id. at 300–303; see also Monica Davey, Kevorkian Speaks After His Release From Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, (June 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/us/04kevorkian.html (indicating that
even after eight years of imprisonment, Dr. Kevorkian still felt strongly about MAID).
214. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
215. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d at 303.
216. Id. at 304 (citing Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)).
217. Id. at 306.
218. Id.
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Finally, the court expressed concern about judging quality of life.
“Expanding the right of privacy to include a right to commit euthanasia . . . to end
intolerable and irremediable suffering we would inevitably involve the judiciary in
deciding questions that are simply beyond its capacity.”219

3. Hooker v. Slattery (Davidson County, Tenn. 2016)
In May 2015, John Jay Hooker filed a lawsuit asserting a right to MAID
under the Tennessee Constitution. In September 2015, the trial court held that
Hooker had no right to MAID under the Tennessee Constitution.220 In any case, the
state had compelling state interests to prohibit MAID. Hooker unsuccessfully sought
review directly from Supreme Court of Tennessee.221 Hooker then voluntarily
dismissed the appeal before a ruling from the intermediate appellate court.222

4. Donorovich-O’Donnell v. Harris (Cal. App. 2015)
Before California enacted the End of Life Options Act in October 2015, two
separate sets of plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits seeking to establish a state
constitutional right to MAID. In May 2015, Christy Lynne Donorovich-O’Donnell
with other terminally ill patients and a physician filed in San Diego Superior Court.223
In July 2015, the court sustained the defendants’ demurrers, holding that no state
constitutional right to privacy, free speech, or equal protection extended to MAID.224
By the time the California Court of Appeal issued its opinion, the legislature
had already enacted the End of Life Options Act. Yet, that did not moot the case
because the law was not yet in effect.225 In October 2015, the Court of Appeal
affirmed the Superior Court.226 The California Supreme Court declined to hear the
case.227
The plaintiffs in Donorovich-Odonnell argued that, as applied to competent,
terminally ill persons seeking lethal medication to end their lives, the application of
the criminal assisted suicide law to MAID deprived citizens of “autonomy
privacy.”228 The California Constitution’s explicit grant of a right to privacy could
indeed protect more than the federal Constitution does, but the court in refused to so
hold because the plaintiffs had not “parse[d] out why the reasoning of Glucksberg or
Vacco is ostensibly inapplicable.”229 It also cited Donaldson as holding that the state

219. Id. at 307 (emphasis in original).
220. See Hooker v. Slatery, No. 15061511 (Davidson Cty. Ch. Ct., Tenn. Sept. 29, 2015).
221. See Hooker v. Slatery, No. M2015-01982-SC-RDM-CV (Tenn. Nov. 9, 2015).
222. See Hooker v. Slatery, No. M2015-01982-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).
223. See Complaint at 1, Donorovich-O’Donnell v. Harris, No. 37-2015-00016404-CU-CR-CTL (San
Diego Sup. Ct. May 15, 2015).
224. See Ruling on Demurrer, Donorovich-O’Donnell v. Harris, No. 37-2015-00016404-CU-CR-CTL
(San Diego Sup. Ct. July 24, 2015).
225. In addition, it is worth ruling on the constitutionality of MAID, because the California End of
Life Options Act is scheduled to sunset in 2026.
226. See Donorovich-O’Donnell v. Harris, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 579, 582 (Ct. App. Oct 29, 2015).
227. Donorovich-Odonnell v. Harris, No. S230918, 2016 Cal. LEXIS 646 (Feb. 3, 2016).
228. See Donorovich-O’Donnell, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590.
229. Id. at 594.
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constitution could not shield a third person from criminal liability for assisting a
person in committing suicide.230
In sum, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s asserted right to obtain “assistance
of a third party in committing suicide” was not fundamental. Even if it were, the state
had compelling interests in enforcing its statutory prohibition of suicide assistance
in cases of MAID. Specifically, the state has an interest in ensuring that people are
not influenced to kill themselves, and interests in preserving life, maintaining the
ethics of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups, and guarding against
a slippery slope toward involuntary euthanasia.
Overridingly, however, the court opined that the matter was one for the
legislature rather than the courts. In doing so, it focused on the legislative imposition
of many safeguards on the process of MAID in California’s End of Life Options Act.
“If the law were changed by judicial opinion, these extensive safeguards would not
be in place.”231

5. Brody v. Harris (San Francisco Sup. Ct. 2016)
In February 2015, another set of California plaintiffs filed in San Francisco
Superior Court. They also made state constitutional claims. In February 2016, the
court sustained the defendants’ demurrers.232 The trial court ruled that the right to
privacy did not include MAID.233 It also ruled that disallowing MAID did not violate
equal protection.234 Moreover, the court observed that the legislature had recently
acted. The plaintiffs appealed but later voluntarily dismissed.235

D. Ongoing Litigation in 2018
While plaintiffs have been unable to establish a state constitutional right to
MAID in any jurisdiction, they keep trying. There are two active cases: one in Hawaii
and one in Massachusetts.

1. Radcliffe v. Hawaii (1st Cir. Ct., Haw. 2016)
In January 2017, John Radcliffe filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. But in July 2017, the trial court refused to address the merits of
Radcliffe’s challenge to the Hawaii assisted suicide statute, deferring the questions
to the political branches of government.236 First, the court held that plaintiffs cannot
challenge a criminal statute through declaratory judgment. Second, the court held
that it would not interfere with the state medical board and declare that MAID was

230. See id. at 592–93 (citing Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992)).
231. Id. at 595.
232. Order Sustaining Demurrers at *4–5, Brody v. Harris, 2016 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1564 (No. CGC15-544086) (San Francisco Sup. Ct. Feb. 16, 2016).
233. See id. at 3 (citing Donorovich-O’Donnell, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 579 and Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
59).
234. See id. at 3–4 (citing Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)).
235. Brody v. Harris, No. A148572 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2016).
236. Radcliffe v. Hawai’i, No. 17-1-0053-1-KKH, slip op. at 12–13 (1st Cir., Haw. July 14, 2017).
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legitimate medical practice. Third, the court refused to issue an injunction, because
the statute was presumed valid. The case is now on appeal.237

2. Kligler v. Healy (Suffolk County Sup. Ct., Mass. 2017)
In October 2016, two physicians filed a lawsuit in Suffolk County,
Massachusetts court seeking a declaration that the state attorney general and a district
attorney could not prosecute them for engaging in MAID.238 One of the plaintiff
physicians was terminally ill and seeking the option, while the other was willing to
write the prescription if he would not be criminally punished for doing so. The
plaintiffs asserted that the state’s prohibition of MAID violated the Massachusetts
constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that MAID was protected by the state
constitutional rights to privacy, liberty, free speech, and equal protection.
In May 2017, the trial court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.239
The court ruled that the case could proceed in the face of arguments that the court
lacked jurisdiction over it and that the court should dismiss it either because any
judicial decision would not completely resolve the dispute or because the matter of
MAID is best left to the legislature. The court noted several times that it was not
opining on the merits of the case, merely ruling that it had jurisdiction and would
retain the case on the docket.

VII. LEGALIZING MAID THROUGH STATUTORY LITIGATION
In addition to making claims under the U.S. Constitution and under state
constitutions, advocates have also brought statutory interpretation claims. They
argue that MAID is not encompassed within the criminal prohibition of “assisted
suicide.” Advocates maintain that MAID and assisted suicide are such different acts
that the prohibition of one does not entail the prohibition of the other.
The argument maintains that the choice of a competent dying patient for a
peaceful death through MAID is not “suicide.” MAID involves the rational choice
of a competent, terminally ill patient who finds herself trapped in an unbearable
dying process to precipitate death in order to avoid further suffering and preserve her
personal dignity. Suicide, by contrast, is a person’s choice to prematurely cut short a
viable life, usually for reasons of a transient nature and often involving depression
or other mental health impairments, recovery from which may be possible with
counseling, support, and/or medication. Because MAID is not suicide, it is not
covered by the assisted suicide statutes.
Indeed, a growing consensus of medical, mental health and health policy
professionals recognize that the choice of a dying patient for a peaceful death through
aid in dying is not “suicide.” For example, the American Psychological Association

237. See Radcliffe v. State, No. CAAP-17-000594, ECOURT KŌKUA, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/
legal_references/records/jims_system_availability (follow “Click Here to Enter eCourt* Kokua”; then
follow “Search for case details by case ID or citation number,” and search with case ID: “CAAP-170000594”) (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
238. See Kligler v. Healy, 34 Mass. L. Rptr. 239 (Super. Ct. 2017). See generally Roger Kligler, The
Death I Want, BOS. MAG. (Jan. 15, 2017, 6:05 am), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/health/2017/
01/15/the-death-i-want-roger-kligler/.
239. See id.
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recognizes that “the reasoning on which a terminally ill person (whose judgments
are not impaired by mental disorders) bases a decision to end his or her life is
fundamentally different from the reasoning a clinically depressed person uses to
justify suicide.”240 Even more recently, the American Association of Suicidology
concluded that “suicide and physician aid in dying are conceptually, medically, and
legally different phenomena.”241

Yet, despite the semantic and logical cogency of the argument
differentiating “suicide” and “MAID,” no court has ever accepted it. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court of Montana did accept a statutory
interpretation argument based on the unique consent defense in its statute.
A. Baxter v. Montana (Mont. 2009)
As discussed above, the Montana trial court in Baxter found a state
constitutional right to MAID.242 The Montana Supreme Court neither affirmed nor
reversed that holding, but vacated it. Because the court found a statutory ground for
MAID, it did not need to reach the constitutional issue. The Montana Supreme Court
ruled that physicians may legally assist competent, terminally ill patients in dying by
writing prescriptions for lethal medications at their request.243
Suicide is not a crime in Montana, and aiding or soliciting a suicide is only
a crime if the victim does not die. Instead, the crime that applies to aiding or soliciting
a successful suicide is homicide.244 Yet, the Montana legislature provides that
consent is generally a defense to criminal charges, except in four enumerated
situations.
The issue for the Montana Supreme Court was whether the consent that a
competent, terminally ill patient would be giving for MAID was against public
policy.245 The court ruled that it was not, in part based on statutory interpretation and
in part based on the “legislative respect for the wishes of a patient facing incurable
illness” that appeared throughout Montana’s statutes authorizing withholding and
withdrawal of treatment.246 Significantly, the Montana Supreme Court noted: “In
light of the long-standing, evolving and unequivocal recognition of the terminally ill
patient’s right to self-determination at the end of life in [the Montana statutes], it
would be incongruous to conclude that a physician’s indirect aid in dying is contrary
to public policy.”247

240. Patients’ Rights to Self-Determination at the End of Life, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Oct. 28 2008),
https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policydatabase/2014/07/29/13/28/patients-rights-to-self-determination-at-the-end-of-life.
241. AM. ASS’N OF SUICIDOLOGY, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SUICIDOLOGY:
“SUICIDE” IS NOT THE SAME AS “PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING” 4 (2017), http://www.suicidology.org/
Portals/14/docs/Press%20Release/AAS%20PAD%20Statement%20Approved%2010.30.17%20ed%201
0-30-17.pdf.
242. See supra Section VI.B.
243. See Baxter v. State, 2009 MT 449, ¶ 50, 224 P.3d 1211 (2009).
244. See id. ¶ 11.
245. See id. ¶ 13 (“Consent is ineffective if: . . . it is against public policy to permit the conduct or the
resulting harm, even though consented to.”) (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211(2)).
246. Id. ¶ 38.
247. Id.
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Unlike the six states that enacted MAID statutes, Montana has no legal
requirements concerning eligibility criteria or request and prescription procedures.
Consequently, the practice of MAID in Montana is presumably governed by the
professional standard of care and regulatory process.248

B. Blick v. Connecticut (Hartford Jud. Dist., Conn. 2010)
In October 2009, Gary Blick brought a lawsuit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Connecticut assisted suicide statute did not cover MAID. The court
rejected the argument, observing that the statute’s application to MAID is amply
demonstrated by multiple legislative attempts to amend the assisted suicide law to
permit MAID.249 The court declined to usurp a legislative function. Furthermore,
because the attorney general would not exceed its authority by prosecuting MAID,
the lawsuit was barred by sovereign immunity.250

C. Other Cases
Almost every recent case asserting state constitutional claims has also made
statutory interpretation claims.251 Yet, not a single court has accepted the statutory
interpretation argument. As in Blick, every court agreed that MAID was
encompassed within the state’s prohibition of suicide assistance, as a matter of
statutory interpretation.
For example, in Morris, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that MAID
constitutes “deliberately aiding another in the taking of his own life,” and thus
constitutes suicide assistance under the statute.252 The court found “compelling”
evidence indicating that medical and psychological professionals do not consider
MAID to be suicide and that the deaths in cases of MAID are considered to result
from the underlying disease, not the taking of the medication. Nevertheless, the
legislature had explicitly distinguished “assisted suicide” from withholding and
withdrawal elsewhere in New Mexico’s statutory scheme. The court held that the
practice came within the statutory definition of suicide assistance.253

VIII. OTHER MEANS OF LEGALIZING MAID
While only a statute or appellate judgment provides patients and clinicians
with clear sufficient ex ante permission to engage in MAID, there are two other
means of “legalizing” the practice. First, lawmakers can limit prosecutorial
discretion, thus making it unlikely that MAID participants will be arrested or

248. Cf. Kathryn L. Tucker, Aid in Dying, 142 CHEST. 218, 220 (2012) (noting that MAID is protected
in Montana and that “absent a prohibition, the practice . . . can proceed subject to the best practices and
an emerging standard of care”).
249. See Blick v. Office of the Div. of Criminal Justice, No. CV095033392, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1412, at *21 (2010).
250. See id. at *42.
251. See supra Sections VI.A & VI.C (including Morris, Myers, O’Donnell, and Brody).
252. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 836 (2016) (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-2-4).
253. See id.
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prosecuted. Second, even if MAID participants are prosecuted, juries can refuse to
convict.

A. Prosecutorial Discretion
The eminent Canadian health law scholar Jocelyn Downie observes that
“guidelines for how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised . . . may also be a
pathway to a more permissive legal regime.”254 Prosecutors already exercise
significant discretion as to which cases to pursue.255 Downie argues that while MAID
would remain illegal, prosecutors could publish guidelines indicating the factors and
circumstances under which they would prosecute.
There is substantial track record for this approach outside the United States.
For example, before affirmative legalization in 2002, MAID was tolerated for
decades in the Netherlands.256 In Switzerland, MAID is widely practiced, yet still not
affirmatively regulated.257 In the UK, MAID is clearly prohibited by the Suicide Act
of 1961.258 Nevertheless, in 2010, the Crown Prosecution Service introduced
guidelines.259 At least one U.S. jurisdiction has taken a similar approach.260
Surprisingly, physicians provide MAID with significant frequency even in
those jurisdictions where it remains illegal. Still, there have been few prosecutions.
The paucity of reported legal cases is probably attributable primarily to the failure
by law enforcement authorities to detect their occurrence. Yet, even when these cases
“come to the attention of the authorities, by dint of pervasive discretion in the
criminal justice system,” prosecutors do not bring indictments.261 If prosecutors

254. Jocelyn Downie, Permitting Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Law Reform Pathways
for Common Law Jurisdictions, 16 QUT L. REV. 84, 91 (2016); see also Ben White & Jocelyn Downie,
Prosecutorial Guidelines for Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Autonomy, Public Confidence
and High Quality Decision-Making, 36 MELB. U. L. REV. 656 (2012).
255. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE (2007).
256. See Agnes van der Heide et al., End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands over 25 Years, 377 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 492 (2017).
257. See Samia A. Hurst & Alex Mauron, Assisted Suicide in Switzerland: Clarifying Liberties and
Claims, 31 BIOETHICS 199, 199 (2017).
258. See R (In re Purdy) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 AC (HL) 345 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
259. THE DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF
ENCOURAGING OR ASSISTING SUICIDE (2010); see also R (Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Justice [2013]
EWCA (Civ) 961, [2015] AC 657 (Eng.) (involving prosecution after the guidelines were created), rev’d,
[2014] UKSC 38; Alexandra Mullock, Compromising on Assisted Suicide: is ‘Turning a Blind Eye’
Ethical?, 7 CLINICAL ETHICS 17 (2012) (discussing the effects of the guidelines); Assisted Suicide,
CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/assisted-suicide
(providing the latest assisted suicide figures).
260. See Bisbee Taking a Stance on Assisted Suicide, KVOA.COM (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.
kvoa.com/story/29964343/bisbee-taking-a-stance-on-assisted-suicide (reporting a city council resolution
asking the Cochise County Attorney to “deprioritize” prosecuting anyone involved in MAID).
261. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 21, § 12.04[D]; see also Kenneth A. De Ville, Physician
Assisted Suicide and the States: Short, Medium, and Long Term, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: WHAT
ARE THE ISSUES? 171, 173–75 (Loretta M. Kopelman & Kenneth A. De Ville eds., 2001). For example,
Dr. Rodney Syme was never prosecuted after admitting to assisting the suicide of Steve Guest. See Jeff
Turnbull, ‘Benign Conspiracy’ over a Death, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (April 21, 2009),

Symposium 2018

LEGAL HISTORY OF MAID

301

provide ex ante guidance in when they will bring charges, then patients and
physicians might have sufficient comfort and clarity to engage in MAID despite its
illegality.

B. Jury Nullification
Closely related to prosecutorial discretion is jury nullification. Just as
prosecutors can decline to prosecute illegal activity, jurors can decline to convict
when there is prosecution. Even when evidence of factual guilt is clear, and the jury
believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in MAID, the jury
can still vote the defendant “not guilty.”262 Juries can and do refuse to convict when
they think the underlying law is unjust.
Jury nullification is common in MAID cases.263 For example, Tim Quill
wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine that he participated in MAID.264 This
was a very public confession. And MAID is criminally prohibited in New York.265
Nevertheless, a Rochester grand jury refused to indict Dr. Quill.266 Similarly,
Michigan juries repeatedly refused to convict Jack Kevorkian despite his clear
violation of laws in that state.267 In short, while not the same as decriminalization,
jury nullification, like prosecutorial discretion, could help pave a pathway to
MAID.268

IX. CONCLUSION
The legalization is MAID in the United States is a train that has left the
station. It will eventually reach most of the other forty-nine U.S. jurisdictions where
it is not yet legal. Yet, policymakers must then grapple with next-generation issues
such as the appropriate eligibility criteria and process requirements. The safeguards
built into the existing six statutes may unduly restrict access to MAID.269

http://www.smh.com.au//breaking-news-national/benign-conspiracy-over-assisted-death-20090421adie.html.
262. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952) (“[J]uries are not bound by what seems
inescapable logic to judges.”). See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 57–97 (1994); CLAY S.
CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION (Cato Inst. Press 2014).
263. See generally Liana C Peter-Hagene & Bette L Bottoms, Attitudes, Anger, and Nullification
Instructions Influence Jurors’ Verdicts in Euthanasia Cases, 23 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 983 (2017)
(researching the potential for nullification due to MAID attitudes).
264. See De Ville, supra note 261, at 173.
265. See Myers v. Schneiderman, 85 N.E.3d 57 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).
266. See Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES (July 27, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/27/nyregion/jury-declines-to-indict-a-doctorwho-said-he-aided-in-a-suicide.html.
267. Michigan juries repeatedly acquitted Jack Kevorkian, in trials over the suicide of: Thomas Hyde
(May 1994), Ali Khalil and Merian Frederick (March 1996), and Sherry Miller and Marjorie Wantz (May
1996). See NEAL NICOL & HARRY WYLIE, BETWEEN THE DYING AND THE DEAD 185–187 (Univ. of Wis.
2006) (2006). Only when Kevorkian moved from assisted suicide to active euthanasia was he convicted
of second degree murder in the killing of Thomas Youk. See Jail Time for Dr. Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES
(April 15, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/15/opinion/jail-time-for-dr-kevorkian.html.
268. In addition, even when there are convictions, the sentences are often very light.
269. See Pope, supra note 20.

